Détente - Wikipedia
None! Detente was long dead before reagan and his Strategic Defense Initiative ( SDI) According to Encyclopedia Britannica: détente, Period of. The star wars refer to the United states Defense initiative who prevent soviets' military missiles. It was one of Reagan's campaigned anti detente. The section 'The arms race and “Star Wars”' looks at the era of the frenzied arms race, New President Ronald Reagan used the term 'evil empire' to describe the USSR Détente was forgotten and the number of direct and indirect interventions Gorbachev openly displayed his wish to develop closer relations with the.
They had hopes that the Soviets would, in return, help the United States extricate or remove itself from Vietnam. People then started to notice the consciousness in which the American politics started to act with.
Episodes throughout the s caused this discontent in the American society to increase. The Americans claimed that the Court didn't impose laws against events such as extreme social and racial inequality and that this led to poverty. The Vietnam War gradually agitated and divided the American people.
The American anti-war activists reached their peak of discontent in This particular year was one of the bloodiest in that time period. This was caused especially by the launch of Tet offensive, an all-out attack against South Vietnam making the number of deaths become greater and therefore increase the American discontent. These protests reached their apex in August while the Democratic National Convention in Chicago was ongoing.
In Latin Americathe United States continued to block any leftward electoral shifts in the region by supporting right-wing military coups ; during this period, there were also many communist or leftward guerrillas around the region, which were allegedly backed by the Soviets and Cuba. Neither side trusted the other fully and the potential for nuclear war remained constant.
Each side continued to aim thousands of nuclear warheads atop intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs at each other's cities, maintain submarines with long-range nuclear weapon capability Submarine-launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs in the world's oceans, keep hundreds of nuclear-armed aircraft on constant alert, and guard contentious borders in Korea and Europe with large ground forces.
- U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1981–1991
- Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program
- The Cold War 1972-1991
Espionage efforts remained a high priority as defectorsreconnaissance satellitesand signal intercepts measured intentions and attempted to gain strategic advantage. Team B The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that was to shore up a struggling allied regime led to harsh criticisms in the west and a boycott of the Summer Olympicswhich were to be held in Moscow. Jimmy Carter boosted the U. A contributing factor in the decline of Detente as a desirable American policy was the inter-service rivalry which existed between the American Departments of State and Defense.
Schlesinger's time as Defense Secretary was plagued by notably poor relations with Henry Kissinger, one of the more prominent American advocates of Detente. Their poor working relationship bled into their professional relationship, and as a result an increasing number of policy clashes began to accrue.
These clashes would inevitably result in Schlesinger's dismissal in However, his replacement, Donald Rumsfeld, shared Shlesinger's distaste for Kissinger.
The example of the "Kontakt" program shows that although SDI appeared to be dominating the agenda, it was not a major factor in the decisions that were being made by the Soviet Union at that time.
The industry did not try to frame the "Kontakt" program as an anti-SDI effort, relying instead on a proven argument that it has to develop systems similar to those of the United States.
What is the relationship between Star Wars and Ronald Reagan to detente?
Even later, when a number of anti-satellite programs were indeed promoted as "anti-SDI", the "Kontakt" system was still considered in a separate category. By the early s the Soviet industry had had some experience with the directed-energy weapon technologies that were supposed to became the key element of the future U. That experience was apparently mixed, raising a legitimate question as to what extent the United States would be more successful in making working weapons based on these technologies.
The Military Industrial Commission set up a commission that included scientists as well as representatives of the military and the defense industry. The main conclusion of the commission, chaired by Evgeny Velikhov, was that deployment of prototypes of weapon systems based on directed energy technologies would be unlikely before about The most well known of these is a study group organized by Evgeny Velikhov and his colleagues at the Committee of Soviet Scientists.
That group, working in close cooperation with scientists from the United States, issued a number of public reports on SDI technology and its potential effect on strategic stability, which were well known in the United States and in the Soviet Union. The military also launched their own studies to evaluate the Strategic Defense Initiative. These were done at various levels - from the defense minister to departments at the research institutes of armed forces services.
In fact, internal reports called for continuing research in the area of directed energy technologies, which may have helped the industry to make its case. As a result, by the summer ofthe Soviet defense industry had prepared its own program that was supposed to become the Soviet response to SDI. This program is described in the next section. Symmetric response The series of decisions made in the summer of was arguably the high point of the Soviet response to the U.
Strategic Defense Initiative program. By that time the defense industry had consolidated its proposals and presented the Soviet leadership with a large-scale program that was intended to significantly expand the work on missile defense, military systems in space, and a range of other programs as well. A decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of 15 July approved a number of "long-term research and development programs aimed at exploring the ways to create a multi-layered defense system with ground-based and space-based elements.
The goal of the research and development effort was "to create by a technical and technological base in case the deployment of a multi-layered missile defense system would be necessary. The first of these two, known as "D" included research and development in the area of ground-based missile defenses.
The responsibility for this program was assigned to the Ministry of Radio Industry, which traditionally worked on missile defense, early warning, and command and control. The second program, "SK", was a product of design bureaus of the Ministry of General Machine Building, which was responsible for the missile and space-related research, development and production.
This program concentrated on space-based missile defenses and on anti-satellite systems, both ground-based and space-based.
Most of the projects included that were concentrated in these two large "umbrella" programs existed beforebut some were either significantly upgraded or entirely new efforts. The mainstay of the program, the A system, was to be prepared for tests in In addition to that, the schedule approved in directed the industry to complete a draft design of the A and a preliminary design of the A follow-on systems by They were expected to provide defense of the "Moscow industrial region" and "main administrative centers and military objects" respectively.
In addition to the line of missile defense systems that were oriented toward protection of Moscow and other population centers, the "D" program included another line of defenses - "close-range" systems, designed to protect military objects and missile silos in particular.
The first of these projects, the S system, was essentially a continuation of an earlier effort to develop a short-range endoatmospheric intercept system, known as S, which goes all the way back to the early s. The S system had been usually considered a contender for the endoatmospheric intercept in the A and similar systems discussed in the s and s.
It was scheduled to begin flight tests in and be ready for deployment in Details about this system are scarce, but it appears to be a version of the Swarmjet idea that was discussed in the United States at the time. The "Sambo" system appeared to rely on rods to destroy incoming warheads.
This system was described as an "active two-tier" defense and it was supposed to use short-range interceptors with conventional explosive warheads. It was expected to reach the deployment stage by Most of the programs were research projects that were expected to produce initial reports in the time frame.
The second program approved by the July decision, "SK", was more in line with the Strategic Defense Initiative vision. It included a variety of projects that explored a possibility of developing space-based missile defenses, anti-satellite systems, and of what the Soviet Union traditionally called "space-strike weapons" - systems designed to attack targets on earth from space.
Like its more conventional counterpart, "SK" was a combination of projects that began in the s and of some new ones. The majority of "SK" programs were devoted to fundamental and applied research, but there were some prominent development projects as well.
The most advanced part of "SK" was the series of anti-satellite programs that were intended to attack "combat and information support satellites, in particular those that are part of the space-based tier of the U. There were also two research projects that explored weapons based on "other physical principles".
The new project, however, was completely under control of the Ministry of General Machine Building, unlike "IS", where a design bureau of the Ministry of Radio Industry was the primary developer. In it was projected that the system would be ready for flight tests in The "Kamin" development program had a much more distant goal - it was not expected to produce a draft project until Flight tests of the system were not expected to begin until Most of these were research projects that were expected to produce preliminary reports in A number of development programs were dedicated to improving the command and control system of the space forces.
Although most of these projects clearly had existed before the July decision, bundling them together with the anti-SDI program was probably the way for the industry to get more reliable access to resources. Arms control takes over The decisions made by the Soviet government in July indicated a major commitment to development of a broad range of missile defense and space weapons technologies.
The defense industry was clearly taking advantage of the situation created by the U. Another factor that contributed to the decision to approve this kind of confrontational response was the actively discussed in the United States possibility of ending its compliance with the SALT II Treaty. That alternative to the industry push would eventually emerge with the changes in the U. Evolution of one of the programs, the "Skif" space-based anti-satellite laser system, can serve as a good illustration of this process.
That spacecraft would still have a laser on board, although not of the kind that could be used in anti-satellite missions. It was expected to be ready for its first flight by the end of The decisions of Julyhowever, called for an accelerated deployment schedule. The industry was ordered to produce a spacecraft that would be flown as early aseven though that meant that it would be only a mockup and would not have much of functioning equipment on board.
The new spacecraft was designated "Skif-DM". The acceleration of the "Skif" program was matched by a decision to move forward the first launch of the "Energiya" heavy launcher, which was expected to deliver "Skif-DM" into orbit.
The arms race and 'Star Wars' - The Cold War (–) - CVCE Website
The "Skif-DM" program proceeded at accelerated pace and by the fall of the work on the spacecraft was largely completed. The test flight of the "Energiya" launcher with "Skif-DM" spacecraft was scheduled to take place in the spring of The spacecraft, which was initially conceived as a mockup, now incorporated some elements that made it somewhat more than a simple weight imitation payload.
Among these were a cueing and targeting system that included a radar and a low-power laser and a set of sophisticated targets to be separated from the spacecraft during a test of the cueing and targeting mechanism.
The spacecraft was also supposed to test a recoilless exhaust system for a gas-dynamic laser that was to be installed in subsequent flights. If the decision to build a spacecraft that would perform a variety of weapon-related experiments in orbit seemed natural init appeared much less so in the end of The summit meeting in Reykjavik in Octoberwhere the issue of testing of missile defense systems in space played a very prominent role, apparently forced the Soviet leadership to pay closer attention to the effect that its programs in space may have on the Soviet position at the negotiations.
In Februarythe experiments that included separating of targets and tracking them with a radar and laser were cancelled. Also cancelled was the experiment that would emulate work of a gas-dynamic laser in space. The Politburo gave its approval to the launch at the very last moment. This probably helped the Soviet Union to avoid a major diplomatic setback. Even though most of the experiments on board of the spacecraft had been cancelled, it is likely that a success of the "Skif-DM" mission would have complicated the efforts to limit development of space-based weapon systems.
The apparent controversy that surrounded the test flight of "Skif-DM" in May reflected the fundamental shift in priorities that happened since the program was approved in If in the program was seen as one of the central elements of a strategy that would preserve strategic balance, in the Soviet political leadership considered this program an impediment to its efforts to reach an arms control agreement with the United States.
Without the political support the program quickly ground to a halt. Although no formal decision to terminate the "Skif-D" project was made, by September all work on the new spacecraft had stopped.
There is no evidence that would indicate that work on these projects continued after Development of traditional missile defenses, which was at the center of the "D" program, also reached a major turning point in The flagship project in this area, the A Moscow missile defense system, was a much less controversial undertaking than the directed energy projects of the "SK" program.
The system was compliant with the ABM Treaty and was compatible with the Soviet negotiating positions. Deployment of the A system had all the signs of a high-priority project. In March the developers of the A system conducted first flight tests of interceptors at the prototype system at Sary-Shagan. Work on the system continued with tests of radars and interceptors conducted in The system was finally accepted "for experimental service" in December It was fairly common for new weapon systems to begin service in "experimental mode", while the designers worked on addressing the problems discovered during tests.
However, starting in the work on the A system and its successors, A and A, slowed down quite significantly. This development reflected the changes in the assessment of the role that these systems could play.
In contrast with the optimistic assessments of missile defense performance that were characteristic for the days when the "D" program was approved, estimates of showed that the role that systems like A or its successors could play is much more limited.
As part of the studies conducted within the "D" program, the military had developed technical specifications for missile defenses, which required the kind of performance that was technically unrealistic. Deployment of interceptors around Moscow began only in and was not completed until Although some programs in these areas can be traced back to at leastthe coordinated effort in this area began after the Reykjavik summit.
On October 14,two days after the end of the Reykjavik meeting, the Politburo asked the Ministry of Defense to present its proposals on the structure of the strategic offensive forces should the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement on arms reductions.
Politburo also asked the military and the industry to prepare proposals that would "accelerate the work on countermeasures against a possible deployment by the United States of a multilayered national defense system and against its space-based component in particular.
It included subprograms that were dealing with each component of the strategic triad as well as research in the area of strategic command and control. Most of the efforts in "SP" predictably went into the projects that explored the ways to increase survivability of land-based ballistic missiles and development of countermeasures specifically designed to counter space-based missile defenses. All projects of this kind involved two stages - a short-term improvements in survivability and a longer-term research that aimed at exploring additional measures that would increase the effectiveness of missile defense penetration.
But none of these were crush programs - they were expected to produce draft technical projects by and none of the programs had a set date for flight tests.
Specific measures that were supposed to improve effectiveness were subject of separate research programs that were also part of the "SP" program. Most of these were widely discussed in the context of SDI countermeasures at the time - shorter boost phase, rotation of missile bodies, reduced detection signature of warheads, penetration aids, methods of blinding missile defense sensors, etc. All these were relatively long-term research projects that were expected to produce preliminary results by the end of the s.
At first, the "SP" program apparently concentrated on incremental modernization of the existing ICBMs, avoiding any major new development projects.
But the program eventually was taken advantage of to launch new projects as well. The NPO Mashinostroyeniya design bureau developed a concept of an intercontinental missile with a gliding reentry vehicle, presenting it as one more way to defeat the U.
This project, known as "Albatros", was added to the "SP" program in Both these projects existed beforebut they were apparently at the early stages - neither missile was expected to reach the stage of flight test until at least mid The program also included an unusual project, "Podzol", that called for deployment of intermediate- and long-range cruise missiles carried by Mi helicopters.
If the "SP" program included projects that could be classified as "passive" countermeasures, the other "asymmetric response" program, "Kontseptsiya-R" was an effort that was designed to counter the SDI system by directly attacking its satellites. Both these systems had been under development since at least Another project that Minradioprom included under the "Kontseptsiya-R" umbrella appeared to be a new effort - development of a non-nuclear interceptor for the A Moscow missile defense system that would give the system the capability to attack satellites on low earth orbits.
A draft technical project of the ASAT interceptor for the A system, "Amulet", was to be completed inwhich means that no flight tests of that system would be expected until about mids.
In addition to the anti-satellite projects, "Kontseptsiya-R" included all other space-related programs that were conducted by Minradioprom - development of the US-KMO early-warning satellite system that would provide coverage of oceans as well as of the U.
Although the concept of countermeasures or anti-satellite systems that could target SDI satellites had been known and discussed long beforethe approval of the "Protivodeystviye" and "Kontseptsiya-R" programs was a very important step. These programs offered a very detailed and specific set of measures that were within the reach of the Soviet defense industry - most projects used proven technology, did not require any technological breakthroughs, and were relatively inexpensive.
All this gave the Soviet military and political leadership the necessary confidence to pursue arms reductions with the United States. Although technically the issue of missile defense and the ABM Treaty were still discussed at the negotiations, at the summit meeting in Washington in September the Soviet Union effectively dropped the issue.
Among those designed for the boost phase were development of new engines that would allow shortening it, protecting missile bodies with heat absorbing material and implementing rotation of missiles. The countermeasures that were supposed to work during midcourse flight included new penetration aids, maneuverable warheads, and gliding reentry vehicles. As a result, the missile would create multiple targets much earlier in the powered flight, complicating the job of boost-phase missile defense.
According to the estimates that were done for the project, the modification could have been made without significant loss of throw weight and would substantially increase the probability of penetrating the defense.
BBC Bitesize - GCSE History - The Cold War - Edexcel - Revision 3
In all these basing modes silos were to be protected by a close-range missile defense system, "Mozyr", which was developed as part of the "D" program. Implementation of any new measures had to be incorporated into the next generation of strategic systems, which was not expected to be deployed until about mid s.
The "Protivodeystviye" program in effect reconciled the response to SDI with the modernization schedule, providing assurance that the countermeasures could be implemented in time and be effective. Programs that were implemented The ability of the defense industry and the military to come up with an assessment of the U. The converse is true as well - the arms reduction dialogue was consistently undermining the case for the Soviet defense programs, diverting political support to disarmament, conversion of defense industry, and more efficient military spending.
As could be expected, the competition for resources and political support selected those projects that were considered most practical, effective, and inexpensive, eliminating most of the big-ticket exotic technologies like directed energy weapons.
Three projects emerged from the competition and managed to reach the stage of flight tests by