Related to reciprocal: Reciprocal relationship, Reciprocal function, Reciprocal laws are statutes of one state that give rights and privileges to the citizens of another state if that state extends similar privileges to the citizens of the first state. Agreement Between the [Government of the] United States of America and [the (each, a “Party”) have a longstanding and close relationship with respect to for the implementation of FATCA based on domestic reporting and reciprocal .. substantial decisions of the trust, or an estate of a decedent that is a citizen or. State-society relations and citizenshipHuma Haider with Claire Mcloughlin State-society relations is defined by DFID as 'interactions between state institutions.
But confining the discussion to gratitude is limiting.
There are similar limitations in discussions of the do-unto-others golden ruleor ethical principles that are modeled on the mutuality and mutual benevolence that come out of the face-to-face relations envisaged by Emmanuel Levinas or the I-Thou relationships described by Martin Buber.
Like gratitude, these other ideas have things in common with the norm of reciprocity, but are quite distinct from it. Reciprocity, in its ordinary dictionary sense, is broader than that, and broader than all discussions that begin with a sense of mutuality and mutual benevolence.
See the reference below to Becker, Reciprocity, and the bibliographic essays therein. Moreover, norms of gratitude do not speak very directly about what feelings and obligations are appropriate toward wrongdoers, or the malicious. Reciprocity, by contrast, speaks directly to both sides of the equation — requiring responses in kind: Reciprocity, by contrast, because it does not necessarily involve having special feelings of love or benevolence, fits more comfortably into discussions of duties and obligations.
Further, its requirement of an in-kind response invites us to calibrate both the quality and the quantity of the response. The norm of reciprocity thus requires that we make fitting and proportional responses to both the benefits and harms we receive — whether they come from people who have been benevolent or malicious. Working out the conceptual details of this idea presents interesting questions of its own.
The following matters are all considered at length in many of the sources listed below under References, and those authors typically defend particular proposals about how best to define the conceptual details of reciprocity.
What follows here is simply an outline of the topics that are under philosophical scrutiny. If one person invites another to dinner, must the other offer a dinner in return? Must it be directly to the original benefactor, or will providing a comparable favor to someone else be appropriate? If the dinner one receives is unintentionally awful, must one reciprocate with something similarly awful?
Sometimes an immediate tit-for-tat response seems inappropriate, and at other times it is the only thing that will do.
Are there general principles for assessing the qualitative appropriateness of reciprocal responses? Reflective people typically practice a highly nuanced version of the norm of reciprocity for social life, in which the qualitative similarity or fittingness of the response appears to be determined by a number of factors.
The nature of the transaction. One is the general nature of the transaction or relationship between the parties — the rules and expectations involved in a particular interaction itself. Tit for tat, defined in a literal way as an exchange of the identical kinds of goods client list for client list, referral for referral may be the only sort of reciprocal response that is appropriate in a clearly defined business situation.
Similarly, dinner-for-dinner may be the expectation among members of a round robin dinner club. But when the nature of the transaction is more loosely defined, or is embedded in a complex personal relationship, an appropriate reciprocal response often requires spontaneity, imagination, and even a lack of premeditation about where, what, and how soon.
Fitting the response to the recipient.
Another aspect of qualitative fit is what counts subjectively, for the recipient, as a response in-kind. When we respond to people who have benefited us, it seems perverse to give them things they do not regard as benefits.
The general principle here is that, other things equal, a return of good for good received will require giving something that will actually be appreciated as good by the recipient — at least eventually. Similarly for the negative side. When we respond to bad things, reciprocity presumably requires a return that the recipient regards as a bad thing.
A third aspect of qualitative fit is the presence or absence of circumstances that undermine the usual expectations about reciprocity. The example, in a slightly different form, goes back to Plato. The point is that in this unusual circumstance, reciprocity as well as other considerations may require that the recipient not get what he wants at the moment.
Rather, it may be that the recipient should be given what he needs, in some objective sense, whether he ever comes to appreciate that it is good for him. A final determinant of qualitative fit is the general rationale for having the norm of reciprocity in the first place. For example, if the ultimate point of practicing reciprocity is to produce stable, productive, fair, and reliable social interactions, then there may be some tensions between things that accomplish this general goal and things that satisfy only the other three determinants.
- Citizenship: relationship between citizens and state
As Plato observed RepublicBook Iis not rational to harm our enemies in the sense of making them worse, as enemies or as people, than they already are. We may reply to Plato by insisting that reciprocity merely requires us to make them worse-off, not worse, period. But if it turns out that the version of the reciprocity norm we are using actually has the consequence of doing both, or at any rate not improving the situation, then we will have undermined the point of having it. Another definitional issue concerns proportionality.
What counts as too little, or too much in return for what we receive from others? In some cases, such as borrowing a sum of money from a friend who has roughly the same resources, a prompt and exact return of the same amount seems right.
Reciprocity (social and political philosophy)
Less will be too little, and a return with interest will often be too much, between friends. But in other cases, especially in exchanges between people who are very unequal in resources, a literal reading of tit-for-tat may be a perverse rule — one that undermines the social and personal benefits of the norm of reciprocity itself.
How, for example, may badly disadvantaged people reciprocate for the public or private assistance they receive? Requiring a prompt and exact return of the benefit received may defeat the general purpose of the norm of reciprocity by driving disadvantaged people further into debt.
Yet to waive the debt altogether, or to require only some discounted amount seems to defeat the purpose also. Anglo-American legal theory and practice has examples of two options for dealing with this problem. One is to require a return that is equal to the benefit received, but to limit the use of that requirement in special cases.
Bankruptcy rules are in part designed to prevent downward, irrecoverable spirals of debt while still exacting a considerable penalty. Similarly, there are rules for rescinding unconscionable contracts, preventing unjust enrichment, and dealing with cases in which contractual obligations have become impossible to perform.
These rules typically have considerable transaction costs. Another kind of option is to define a reciprocal return with explicit reference to ability to pay. Progressive tax rates are an example of this. Considered in terms of reciprocity, this option seems based on an equal sacrifice interpretation of proportionality, rather than an equal benefit one.
Reciprocity and justice[ edit ] Standard usage of the term justice shows its close general connection to the concept of reciprocity. Justice includes the idea of fairness, and that in turn includes treating similar cases similarly, giving people what they deserve, and apportioning all other benefits and burdens in an equitable way.
Those things, further, involve acting in a principled, impartial way that forbids playing favorites and may require sacrifices.
Citizenship: relationship between citizens and state - Leiden University
All of those things are certainly in the neighborhood of the elements of reciprocity e. Reward and punishment[ edit ] Discussions of merit, desert, blame, and punishment inevitably involve questions about the fittingness and proportionality of our responses to others, and retributive theories of punishment put the norm of reciprocity at their center.
The idea is to make the punishment fit the crime. This differs from utilitarian theories of punishment, which may use fittingness and proportionality as constraints, but whose ultimate commitment is to make punishment serve social goals such as general deterrence, public safety, and the rehabilitation of wrongdoers. Justice and war[ edit ] In just war theorynotions of fittingness and proportionality are central, at least as constraints both on the justification of a given war, and the methods used to prosecute it.
When war represents a disproportionate response to a threat or an injury, it raises questions of justice related to reciprocity. When war fighting employs weapons that do not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, it raises questions of justice related to reciprocity. The poor in particular find it difficult to obtain what they are entitled to. This is true in various fields, such as health care, land ownership or divorce.
The process is complicated because various different factors are at play, such as ethnic and religious diversity, poor law enforcement, a large distance between central government and the people, and big differences between regions within a country. In order to achieve this, you first need to be aware of the problems that are at play.
Strengthening the constitutional state is a complex process. The judge must ensure that women receive maintenance after a divorce, for instance. We began by questioning the assumptions on which this model is based. Divorce occurs a lot — particularly in West Java where we conducted our research — and the reason is usually because the husband does not earn enough.
In such a case, it does not make much sense for the woman to go to court, because the man cannot pay maintenance anyway. As long as the marriage was concluded according to Islamic rules, the community sees it as valid.
But if children are produced in the second marriage, the partners want it to be officially registered to prove that the child was not born out of wedlock. A birth certificate is becoming increasingly important for school places, opening a bank account, marrying, voting, finding a job and welfare and health care.
Officially speaking, the Religious Affairs Office is not allowed to register a second marriage if the divorce was not filed in court. What often happens then is that the civil servant registers the new marriage anyway.
But if other authorities discover that the registration was not according to the rules, for instance the civil registry office that issues birth certificates, you then have a problem.